Zaman, düşünce tarihinde üzerinde çokça tartışılmış ve muhtelif tanımlamaları yapılmış bir kavramdır. Bu makale de zamanın tanımlamasından ziyade onun üzerinde özellikle an kavramı merkezli bir düşünce etkinliği ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Bilhassa zaman ve an kavramları arasındaki farka değinilmiştir. Zamanın hareketin olduğu yerde var olduğunu, anın ise hem hareketin hem de durağanlığın olduğu her yerde karşımıza çıktığını belirterek zamanın akışkan hayatı ölçülebilir kılma çabasında var oluşuyla, anın ise bu akışkanlığın her safhasında var olduğuna temas edilmiştir. Aynı zamanda anın varoluş ile mütemadiyen (...) yan yana olduğu, algılanışının ise bireylerin tecrübeleriyle zuhur ettiği görüşü ortaya konulmuştur. An’ın insan tecrübesiyle anlam kazanması ve insanın anı nasıl değerlendirmesi gerektiği hususunda konu, kanaatimizce Asr Suresi ve Hz. Peygamberin (s.a.v) buyruğu ile temellendirilmiştir. Bahsi geçen konu, çeşitli filozofların görüşleri ile de desteklenmiştir. Daha sonra makalemizde modern düşüncenin insanı anı kaliteli yaşamaktan ziyade daha iyi gelecek vaadiyle kaygı ve huzursuzluğa sevk ettiğini ifade ettik. Makalemizin sonunda ise İslam’ın bu modern düşüncenin aksine insana akışkanlık içerisinde yaşarken anın kendisine sunduğu akışkanlığın her bir aşamasını en güzel şekilde değerlendirmesini emrettiği ve onu değerli bir maden gibi tavında işlemesi gerektiği mesajıyla sonuçlandırdık. (shrink)

Zaman, düşünce tarihinde üzerinde çokça tartışılmış ve muhtelif tanımlamaları yapılmış bir kavramdır. Bu makale de zamanın tanımlamasından ziyade onun üzerinde özellikle an kavramı merkezli bir düşünce etkinliği ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Bilhassa zaman ve an kavramları arasındaki farka değinilmiştir. Zamanın hareketin olduğu yerde var olduğunu, anın ise hem hareketin hem de durağanlığın olduğu her yerde karşımıza çıktığını belirterek zamanın akışkan hayatı ölçülebilir kılma çabasında var oluşuyla, anın ise bu akışkanlığın her safhasında var olduğuna temas edilmiştir. Aynı zamanda anın varoluş ile mütemadiyen (...) yan yana olduğu, algılanışının ise bireylerin tecrübeleriyle zuhur ettiği görüşü ortaya konulmuştur. An’ın insan tecrübesiyle anlam kazanması ve insanın anı nasıl değerlendirmesi gerektiği hususunda konu, kanaatimizce Asr Suresi ve Hz. Peygamberin (s.a.v) buyruğu ile temellendirilmiştir. Bahsi geçen konu, çeşitli filozofların görüşleri ile de desteklenmiştir. Daha sonra makalemizde modern düşüncenin insanı anı kaliteli yaşamaktan ziyade daha iyi gelecek vaadiyle kaygı ve huzursuzluğa sevk ettiğini ifade ettik. Makalemizin sonunda ise İslam’ın bu modern düşüncenin aksine insana akışkanlık içerisinde yaşarken anın kendisine sunduğu akışkanlığın her bir aşamasını en güzel şekilde değerlendirmesini emrettiği ve onu değerli bir maden gibi tavında işlemesi gerektiği mesajıyla sonuçlandırdık. (shrink)

As in classical Latin philosophical and theological texts, Spinoza did not make any semantic distinction between the concepts of conscientia and conscius, and used one interchangeably. But the concept of conscientia is used as an “inner voice” or “conscience” meaning “moral sensitivity” or “moral awareness” and expresses both rational and irrational processes in traditioanl philosophy. On the other hand, the concept of conscius is used in the sense of “consciousness” and expresses a mental or psychological reflexive activity based on rational (...) processes in the same tradition. Based on Spinoza's use of the two concepts in the same sense, this study claims that “moral sensitivity” is formed as a result of reflexive thinking, which is a mental action. Where consciousness is understood as a reflexive activity based on the relationship between ideas, it is argued that “moral awareness” occurs in the mind as an idea formed as a result of the relationship between ideas. In the study, it is determined that Spinoza developed a kind of “moral consciousness” theory based on the awareness in question, rather than a “conscience theory”. The main focus of the study is that the idea of “good” and “evil”, which are the basic concepts in Spinoza’s ethics, arise from the idea of “joy” and “sadness” that occur as emotions in the mind. Here, “joy” or “sadness” is considered as the primary ideas that occur in the mind as a result of the affection of the body, and “good” or “bad” as secondary ideas formed by the mind as a result of contemplation on these primary ideas. In the article, the theory of “moral consciousness” is based on the “ideas of ideas”, which are the secondary ideas in question. Keywords: Consciousness, Conscience, Awareness, Moral Consciousness, Good-Evil, Joy-Sadness. (shrink)

This article covers the critical edition, translation and analysis of the epistle on creed, al- Muʿtamad min al-muʿtaqad, written by the famous Hanafī jurist ʿAlāʾ al-dīn Abū Bakr b. Masʿūd al-Kāsānī. In his work, which can be evaluated in the literature of creed, al-Kāsānī explains the basics of Hanafī-Māturīdī belief in a brief and concise manner without any discussion. This study consists of three main parts: examination, critical edition and translation. In the examination part of the study, the life of (...) the author is handled with various aspects, and at the same time information is given about the relation of the work to the author, its position in the literature, its method and content as well as its manuscripts. Then, based on the six manuscript copies of the work which are available in various manuscript libraries, the critical edition and the translation of the work is given. It is aimed that this work, which is discussed in Turkish for the first time in an academic article, will contribute to the studies on Hanafī-Māturīdī creed literature to some extent. (shrink)

I attempt an explication of what it means for an operation across domains to be the same on all domains, an issue that ) took to be central for a successful delimitation of the logical operations. Some properties that seem strongly related to sameness are examined, notably isomorphism invariance, and sameness under extensions of the domain. The conclusion is that although no precise criterion can satisfy all intuitions about sameness, combining the two properties just mentioned yields a reasonably robust and (...) useful explication of sameness across domains. (shrink)

According to Islamic law, there are rules and prohibitions that Muslims must follow in their actions and transactions. The prohibition of interest has been decisive in many actions, especially in debt. Accordingly, Muslims cannot put forward a condition of interest in their debt, nor can they take any transactions under this condition. Many jurists viewed interest not only as an excess of the debt but also as any benefit that the creditor would receive from the debtor other than the amount (...) of the loan, and they evaluated it within the scope of interest. Since the lender of “qard”, which is generally used to define the debt, should not receive anything in return and should expect its reward from Allah, this was called “qard al-hasen”, quoting the relevant verses of the Qur’an, and Muslims tried to meet their credit needs through qard al-hasen. However, in some cases, people had difficulty obtaining the credit they needed, and especially in the modern period, the need for credit has increased both individually and institutionally. Therefore, Muslims tried to meet their need for qard by resorting to different ways within the limits of the Shariʽah. While applications based on transactions such as sukuk, mudaraba and murabaha and those based on intermediary transactions such as the purchase and sale of goods or partnerships were developed, applications based on direct debt without resorting to such transactions remained almost non-existent. However, from the expressions in the books of classical fiqh, it is understood that the juʽalah, which is defined as “promising a reward in return for an action”, can be used for obtaining qard under certain conditions. In this type of juʽalah, which can be named as juʽalah ala al-iqtirad, a person in need of qard promises a certain reward from third parties to the person who provides him qard. Considering that there is a qard in question in this transaction and that the debtor pays more than the qard he has received, it is necessary to examine the opinions about this transaction's relationship with interest and its validity. The main focus of the research will be answers to questions such as the conditions that the aforementioned juʽalah transaction must meet to be valid, in what ways this transaction differs from interest-bearing transactions, and within which limits. (shrink)

One of the processes that Zaydism, as a sect that has survived to the present day, went through in the Yemen region is the period that began with Mansûr-Billâh Qasim b. Muhammad, who declared his imamate in the 16th century and continued by the descendants of the ruling class until the declaration of the Republic. However, there is not enough information in the literature about this period, which is known as the Kasimi’s era. Mansûr-Billâh Qasim b. Muhammad has many works (...) on akaid, tafsir, method, islamic law, and in addition, there is a small pamphlet (risalah) written by him. This study aims to introduce the translation of the will written by Mansûr-Billâh Qasim b. Muhammad, who is known as the founder of the Kasimi dynasty, for his son Muayyad-Billâh Muhammad b. Kasım into the literature. (shrink)

The traditions about isrāʾīliyyāt that were seen almost in all the types of Islamic sciences appeared in the sources of tafsīr from early periods. These traditions that were generally used to explain the Qurʾān were seen problem and critisized by some exegetical specialists. Even though corresponding to a relative later period in the classical era, an approach was tried to put forward in view of the traditions about isrāʾīliyyāt. This methodological concern for isrāʾīliyyāt in classical period has increased and been (...) influential for many researchers from east and west to work on this issue in modern times. There has been reached to important results about the issues of the definition of isrāʾīliyyāt, the source of it, its spread in Islamic sciences, its aim of usage, the progress of these positive-negative attitudes against these traditions in historical process. But it is important to discuss some evaluations and analysis again that put forward in this process when different cases about the issue are taken into consideration. According to this, a series of problem, such as how the isrāʾīliyyāt can be defined in tafsīr, when the criticism of isrāʾīliyyāt started, whether Biqāʿī was the first exegete who made reference to Bible or not will be discussed considering relevant resources in this article.Summary: Since the early periods, isrā’īliyyāt narratives were used as a source of information in tafsīrs. These narratives, which are transmitted in various tafsīrs of the Qur’ān, one of the main sources of Islamic religion, have also taken the methodological interests of some exegete since the early periods. This interest continued in the modern period, and both Western and Eastern researchers made research on isrā’īliyyāt. Some of the findings, analyses, and claims available in researches on this subject will be reexamined in this article. The first of these is the problem of the definition of isrā’īliyyāt. In contemporary research, inclusive definitions are made for isrā’īliyyāt, seen in all sources. These definitions do not allow for a refined description of isrā’īliyyāt which is handled in terms of different intentions in the sources of each different field and which varies in terms of the issues it covers, leading to the underestimation of some of its aspects in relevant fields. In the definitions, it is stated that isrā’īliyyāt is mostly learned from the Ahl al-Kitāb, (the People of the Book) it became widespread along with Islām and it included narratives about caliphs, dynasties, and Mahdī, as well. Another issue is to be emphasized that they are fictive or mythological. In classical tafsīrs, isrā’īliyyāt is observed to be related mainly with the history of the Ahl al-Kitāb or with the subjects they know about. In the modern era, the narratives about the ancestors of the Arabs have been identified as isrā’īliyyāt. If some of the isrā’īliyyāt narratives are related to the history of Arabs, then their resource should be the historical-cultural memory of Arabs. However, as almost all Qur’ānic stories were somewhat known before the revelation period and relations with the Ahl al-Kitāb dated back to times long before the Islamic period, the claim that these narratives became widespread along with Islām should be revised. It is also problematic to emphasize the legendary nature of some of the isrā’īliyyāt and to make that as a reason to reject all. Such emphasis also leads to the underestimation of the functions of narratives in tafsīrs. In isrā’īliyyāt, tafsīr was used for i) interpreting the ambiguous words in the stories, ii) to bring evidence to the Ahl al-Kitāb, and ii) tarhīb-targhīb (encouragement-warning). These narratives can be used as a source in tafsīr unless they are explicitly falsified by the data of fields such as history, history of religions and archaeology as well as the Qur’ān and the true Sunnah. The first criticisms of isrā’īliyyāt are claimed to belong to exegete like Ibn al-‘Arabī (d. 543/148) or Ibn ‘Aṭīyah (d. 541/1147). However, criticism of isrā’īliyyāt is also observed in the tafsīrs of earlier exegete, such as al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058) or al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067). They do not necessarily have to use the term isrā’īliyyāt explicitly in their criticism like the later ones. If the narratives they criticize and the reasons for their criticism are the same as those of the later exegete, it will be necessary to date the criticism of isrā’īliyyāt back to the 4th Century of the Hegira. The understanding that "the expression in the story is sufficient, it is unnecessary to deal with the ambiguities; instead, it is necessary to deal with the lesson and wisdom in the story" is one of the criteria that Muḥammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), who is deemed to be the pioneer of the strict criticism of isrā’īliyyāt in the modern period, took as basis in this criticism, is valid for the exegete of the classical period, as well. Although exegete, such as al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923), al-Māturīdī, al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), and Abū Ḥayyān (d. 745/1344) who had this understanding, gave place to isrā’īliyyāt, these people recognized that "these narratives were not final, binding or necessary”, indeed. The understanding that such expression in the story is sufficient, which is one of the reasons for such awareness in the classical period, seems to have turned into a strict rejection in the modern period. Another issue is the claim that Biqā‘ī (d. 885/1480) was the first exegete to systematically benefit from the Bible in tafsīr in the classical period. However, al-Daylamī (d. 593/1197) before Biqā‘ī, is also observed to have used the Old Testament systematically in tafsīr. He cited the Tanakh in his period in two ways. He either directly quoted from the translation of Tanakh or the Hebrew text written in Arabic letters. Another exegete who used the Tanakh as a source in his tafsīr was al-Ṣafadī (d. 696/1296). He enriched his tafsīr with systematic quotations from the Tanakh. Therefore, the use of the Bible as a source of interpretation in the classical period should not be started with Biqā‘ī. The reason why the pioneer exegete of the classical period did not directly use the Bible is claimed to be the fact that they falsified it and deemed the isrā’īliyyāt narrated from the predecessors to be more reliable. However, it is known that a significant portion of the isrā’īliyyāt, which was orally transferred from the predecessors, is based on written sources, particularly including the apocryphal texts. So just like the Bible, isrā’īliyyāt, which was orally transferred from the predecessors, is problematic in terms of authenticity. This allows us to argue that classical exegete have an inconsistent attitude, indeed. On the other hand, when we take into account the fact that classical exegetes criticize these narratives from time to time and believe that they are not final or binding, the problem of potential inconsistency disappears. Accordingly, they did not deem chain transmission of these narratives from the predecessors by reliable transmitters to be a sufficient reason for their acceptance and adoption for good and all. (shrink)

Organizational cronyism refers to favoring some employees within an organization based on non-performance-related factors. Although it is highly likely to encounter many attitudes and behaviors meeting this description within public and private institutions, there are limited studies on this issue. Thus, the purpose of this study is to develop a valid and reliable scale to assess the perception of cronyism among organizational members. To this end, an item pool was formed based on current literature as well the views of teachers (...) and expert recommendations. The validity–reliability of the scale was tested via two sample groups. As a result of the study, a scale with 3 dimensions and 15 items as well as psychometric qualities was developed to assess employee perceptions of cronyism. The scale dimensions comprise: in-group bias, paternal cronyism, and reciprocal exchange of favor in accordance with the way the method was addressed in the literature. The analyses of nomological validity of the scale showed that perception of cronyism is an important predictor of trust in managers. (shrink)

Ethics in business and economics is often attacked for being too superficial. By elaborating the conclusions of two such critics of business ethics and welfare economics respectively, this article will draw the attention to the ethics behind these apparently well-intended, but not always convincing constructions, by help of the fundamental ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. To Levinas, responsibility is more basic than language, and thus also more basic than all social constructions. Co-operation relations in organizations, markets and value networks are generated (...) from personal relations and personal responsibilities. It is not sufficient to integrate ethics in an impersonal, rational system, neither in business organizations nor in the world economy. Ethics has its source not in rationality, but in the personal. (shrink)

Levinas did not present any new ethical theories; he did not even give any normative recommendations. But his phenomenological investigations help us to understand how the idea of ethics emerges and how we try to cope with it. The purpose of this paper is to suggest some implications from a reading of Levinas on how ethical challenges are handled within a management perspective. The paper claims that management, both in theory and in practice, is necessarily egocentric and thus ethically biased. (...) Therefore, ethics, defined as the idea that it is possible to do otherwise than pursue one's own interest, must have its source outside the scope of management. Levinas identifies this source as the call for responsibility from the Other, beyond the reach of managerial control. He also suggests how this idea of ethics is put into practice, especially in economic life: the existence of money makes it both possible and necessary to compare unique and incomparable others. Management tools may be used in the service of always more justice, as it also may be used for the opposite purpose. Instead of trying to draw a normative conclusion from Levinas, we may distinguish between two ways of experiencing reality: one through language and knowledge, covering both descriptive and normative knowledge, including business ethics, and the other through the particular events of encounters, from where this knowledge is continuously questioned through the call for responsibility, and thereby may provide possibilities for continuous improvements towards always more justice. (shrink)

Levinas did not present any new ethical theories; he did not even give any normative recommendations. But his phenomenological investigations help us to understand how the idea of ethics emerges and how we try to cope with it. The purpose of this paper is to suggest some implications from a reading of Levinas on how ethical challenges are handled within a management perspective. The paper claims that management, both in theory and in practice, is necessarily egocentric and thus ethically biased. (...) Therefore, ethics, defined as the idea that it is possible to do otherwise than pursue one's own interest, must have its source outside the scope of management. Levinas identifies this source as the call for responsibility from the Other, beyond the reach of managerial control. He also suggests how this idea of ethics is put into practice, especially in economic life: the existence of money makes it both possible and necessary to compare unique and incomparable others. Management tools may be used in the service of always more justice, as it also may be used for the opposite purpose. Instead of trying to draw a normative conclusion from Levinas, we may distinguish between two ways of experiencing reality: one through language and knowledge, covering both descriptive and normative knowledge, including ‘business ethics’, and the other through the particular events of encounters, from where this knowledge is continuously questioned through the call for responsibility, and thereby may provide possibilities for continuous improvements towards always more justice. (shrink)

Bu çalışmada Türkiye’de ḳırâât tedrisatında istifade edilen mesleklerden biri olan ʿAṭâʾullâh mesleğine ait tercihlerin mahiyeti, Muḥammed ʿÂrif el-Ḥıfẓî’nin Muġni’l-ḳurrâʾ fî şerḥi Muḫtâri’l-iḳrâʾ adlı eseri özelinde ve el-ʿaşru’s-suğrâ programının sınırları içerisinde ortaya konulmuştur. Osmanlı coğrafyasında teşekkül eden ve Anadolu’ya özgü olan ḳırâât meslekleri, ḳırâât tedrisatında günümüze kadar varlığını sürdüregelmiştir. Bu meslekler, taḥrîrât ekolü mesabesinde olmasına rağmen Anadolu toprakları dışında neredeyse bilinmeyen, tanınmayan ve kendisine ḳırâât eğitim-öğretiminde yer verilmeyen bir terminoloji olarak günümüze kadar gelmiştir. Mamafih, söz konusu mesleklerden biri olan ʿAṭâʾullâh mesleğinden (...) ḳırâât tedrisatında günümüze değin yararlanılmasına rağmen bununla ilgili yeteri düzeyde akademik çalışmanın yapılmadığı müşahede edilmiştir. Nitekim ʿAṭâʾullâh mesleğiyle alakalı iki çalışma tespit edilebilmiştir. Bunlardan biri doktora diğeri ise yüksek lisans tez araştırmalarıdır. Bunun dışında mesleklere genel olarak temas edilen ve “Kırâat Eğitiminin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını ve Kırâat Eğitiminde Meslekler” adıyla kitap bölümü olarak basılan bir çalışma ve mesleklere bir bölüm ayrılan Kıraat İlmi Eğitim ve Öğretim Metotları adlı araştırmalar da mevcuttur. Bahsedilen bu ilmi faaliyetlerden Osman Bostan’a ait Ahmed er-Rüşdî ve Mürşidü’t-Talebe Adlı Eserinin Kıraat İlmindeki Yeri adlı eser dışında, meslek tercihlerinin mahiyetinin ortaya konduğu bir çalışmaya rastlanmamıştır. Ancak Bostan’ın söz konusu çalışması, ekseriyetle Ataullah mesleğinin el-ʿaşru’l-kubrâ öğretiminde temel kaynak olarak kabul edilen Murşidu’ṭ-Ṭalebe’ye, bu eserin münderecatındaki vecîh ve tercihlerin tahliline yönelik olarak ele alınmıştır. Dolayısıyla açıklamaya çalıştığımız mevcut boşluğu doldurması beklenen bu çalışmada ise aşere/el-ʿaşru’s-suğrâ öğretiminde ʿAṭâʾullâh mesleği için temel kaynak olarak kabul edilen Muġni’l-ḳurrâʾda geçen vecîhler ele alınmış ve bunlara ait tercihlerin mahiyeti, uṣûl ve ferşu’l-ḥurûfla alakalı örnekler eşliğinde ortaya konulmuştur. Bu bağlamda çalışmanın temel amacı, ʿAṭâʾullâh mesleğiyle ilgili tercihlerin arka planının Muḥammed ʿÂrif el-Ḥıfẓî’nin Muġni’l-ḳurrâʾ fî şerḥi Muḫtâri’l-iḳrâʾ adlı eseri özelinde izah edilmesidir. Nitekim mezkûr mesleğe ait tercihlerin keyfiyeti, el-ʿaşru’ṣ-ṣuġrâ müfredatının temel kaynakları olan et-Teysîr fi’l-ḳırââti’s-sebʿ ile Ḥirzu’l-emânî ve vechu’t-tehânî fi’l-ḳırââti’s-sebʿ adlı eserler ışığı altında açıklığa kavuşturulmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu eserlere ek olarak ḳırâât alan yazınının temel eserlerinden de istifade yoluna gidilerek ʿAṭâʾullâh mesleğine ait tercihlerin ilgili eserlerdeki yeri ve bu tercihlerin sebepleri izah edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda Muġni’l-Ḳurrâʾ özelinde verilen örneklerin hepsinde mervî vecîhlerin tamamının ʿAṭâʾullâh mesleğinde tercih edildiği tespit edilmiş; fakat bunlardan -son örnek hariç olmak üzere- Şâṭıbî’nin kendi usulüne muhalefet ettiği ifade edilen vecîhlerin ise son örnek dışında muaḫḫar vecîh olarak zikredildiği görülmüştür. Ne var ki çalışmada yer verilen son örnekte ise ṭarîḳ muhalefeti söz konusu olmasına rağmen muḫâṭab vechinin ġāib vechine muḳaddem olarak tercih edildiği müşahede edilmiştir. Bununla birlikte ilgili örneklerde Îtilâf, Mutḳin ve Ṣûfî meslekleri tarafından icra edilen vecîhlerin genellikle birbirine mutabık olduğu ve onların bu vecîhlerde ʿAṭâʾullâh mesleğinden ayrıştıkları belirlenmiştir. (shrink)

This study deals with al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s conception of morality, how he bases this conception on hadiths and how he interprets hadiths according to his own Sufi disposition. al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī is one of the foremost Sufis who resorted to the Qur'an and the Sunnah to prove his views on the issues of Sufism and morality. The study aims to analyze his handling of hadiths and the way he resorted to hadiths while grounding moral issues within the framework of his work Nawādir (...) al-Uṣūl. The study reveals that al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī revealed the theoretical framework of the moral issue, determined the relationship between morality and related concepts such as wisdom and ingenuity, and read the hadiths with a moral perspective. In addition, it was concluded that al-Ḥakīm, who deals with the issue of morality from a different perspective, deals with and evaluates different issues that are frequently discussed in works of ethics and touches on the issue of practical ethics. Therefore, we can say that it represents a clear trend in the issue of ethics. However, it should be pointed out that he never touched the authenticity of the hadiths. (shrink)

This volume examines the notion of an analytic proof as a natural deduction, suggesting that the proof's value may be understood as its normal form--a concept with significant implications to proof-theoretic semantics.

In the history of İslāmic thought, Māturīdī is a famous scholar both in the field of kalām and tafsir. Being approved by Māturīdī, the distinction of tafsir and ta’wīl, which makes possible to take the comments made about the verses into sistematic framework, is quite important. There is an important information both about content of the distinction approved by Māturīdī and the main reasons that necessiated this distinction in the introduction of Samarqandī’s Sharh at Ta’wīlāt. From this information, it is (...) understood that the distinction of tafsir and ta’wīl had dated back to older time than Māturīdī and previous scholars dealed with the problem that necessiated this distinction and Māturīdī inherited this distinction from his predecessors. Information in the Sharh at Ta’wīlāt reveals that according to Māturīdī the companions had made interpretation (ta’wīl) in addition to tafsir and the explanations made by certain evidences is tafsir too. Therefore this information gives us the opportunity flexing the acceptance of the idea “tafsir, is dedicated to the companions, ta'wīl is dedicated to fuqaha (jurists)” and asserting that companions and scholars made both tafsir and ta’wīl. In this paper, we will research whether the distinction tafsir and ta’wīl regarded by Māturīdī completely belonged to his or not and content of the distinction and its reasons. We will also analyze this distinction according to examples in the Ta’wîlāt. Summary: An important distinction is made between the concepts of tafsir and ta’wīl in the short preface of Māturīdī's tafsir, and this distinction is particularly prominent in contemporary tafsir studies. Because from the point of view of the value they carry, the explanations for these differences and concepts express the legitimacy of the following mufassirūn (writers of a commentary on the Qur’an) to be able to perform tafsir, as well as the value of the explanations found in tafsir literature in terms of certainty. In Ta'wīlāt, tafsir is described as the precise determination of what is intended. Determination of what is exactly intended in verse/wording is bound to certainly know the conditions under which it was revealed. Because they are the first to be addressed directly and they witnessed the context, the tafsir is only for the companions (ṣaḥābah pl. aṣḥāb). On the other hand, ta’wīl is not a definite determination of what is intended, but rather it is explained as putting the possibilities forward. In this case, ta’wīl is dedicated to the scholars after the companions. When we look at the other tafsir sources that include his views, it can be understood that this brief information in the preface of the tafsir which survived to our day is partially incomplete. Samarqandī's Sharhu’t-ta'wīlāt is the most important of these sources. According to the information here, Māturīdī states that some scholars distinguish tafsir and ta’wīl from each other. In these distinctions, tafsir is either described in relation to a definitive statement or in relation to being familiar with the conditions of revelation, while ta’wīl is described as extracting meanings from the verses and making possible meanings without claiming certainty. These explanations show that the distinction between tafsir and ta’wīl in Ta'wīlāt's preface was mainly based on the period before Māturīdī. These statements, which Māturīdī transmitted from some scholars in the beginning of Sharhu’t-ta'wīlāt, were then transmitted by Omar al-Nasafī, Mahāyimī and Molla Husrev. In some sources, it was also transmitted that similar explanations were made by scholars such as an-Nadr b. Shumayl, al-Hussein b. Fadl al-Bacelī and Ibn Durayd before Māturīdī.Some explanations of Māturīdī in Ta'wīlāt enables the theory of tafsir-ta’wīl to be understood at a wider level. When the examples are examined, it is observed that Māturīdī exhibited two types of attitude against the tafsir of the companions. He states that one of these is that if the transmission is true, what is intended is exactly what is stated in the narrated. The second is that he sometimes does not accept these explanations and suggests additional opinions. The reason he refuses is that sometimes he does not find the transmission reliable, and sometimes he thinks that companions performed ta'wīl. If this is the case, the dedication of ta’wīl to those coming later should not be absolutized. Because the companions can perform both tafsir and ta’wīl. The examples in Ta'wīlāt clearly reveal what areas tafsir, which is defined as a definite statement, covers. According to this, first, tafsir is related to the field of “invisible” about the past and the future. Secondly, its meaning and practice is only about the information of the “statement” about the issues that can be revealed by the Prophet (pbuh). In the third aspect, it is related to “revelation” information reporting the context in which the verses descended. In the beginning of Sharhu’t-ta'wīlāt, Māturīdī says that the explanations made based on the definitive evidences such as mutawātir (repetition; narration reported by large number reporters) and ijmā (consensus) also fall under the category of tafsir. However, it is also necessary to add intellectual evidence to these evidences. Because intellectual evidence is also important in the epistemology of Māturīdī. In fact, the truthfulness of nass (text) is primarily based on intellectual evidence. First, the issues of theology are proven by certain intellectual evidence, and then, on the basis of this, the meanings expressed by the nass acquire the value of certainty and truthfulness. With the definitive acceptance of reason in theology, what some nass express confirm each other and are used as evidence in the process of interpretation. Therefore, since some of the intellectual evidence, ijmā and mutawātir news provide definitive information, explanations based on them are also seen as tafsir. Considering the fact that the above-mentioned evidence was also used by those coming after the companions, it can be concluded that tafsir can be performed by not only the companions but also those coming after them. In this case, it should be accepted that tafsir is not performed only by the companions, and that the succeeding mufassirūn can also perform tafsir as well as ta’wīl. When we look at the examples based on these evidence, there are two different situations in Ta'wīlāt. The first is that Māturīdī sometimes has views on evidence based on mutawātir and ijmā and sometimes suggests different opinions from the assumptions that he said there was ijmā in particular. Because these evidences are certain, it is understandable that he remains bound to them. However, as a possible reason for his opposition to ijmā, it can be said that he thinks only the following generations enter the scope of ijmā. Because, according to Samarqandī, Māturīdī's objection to such information does not seem possible, since ijmā of the companions in a matter is accepted. Although he sometimes said that there was ijmā, the reason why no such ijmā was mentioned in other tafsir sources and sometimes, it may be considered that he did not respect other views in the face of ijmā as a reason for including different views or it may be thought that he was unaware of the different views that were transmitted. The second remarkable situation is that according to Māturīdī, intellectual evidence, in particular, can reveal only the “knowledge of existence” of the issues related to theology. Māturīdī thinks that their nature cannot be certainly known, and that the explanations made regarding their nature are only ta’wīl. For this reason, he firmly rejects the interpretation of the khabarī attributes about Allah in accordance with the idea of tashbīh and tajsīm (anthropomorphism). (shrink)

The paper’s main goal is to compare laws banning hate speech with counterspeech as an effective method of curtailing hate speech. In the first part, the paper discussed three normative justifications for hate speech bans. Firstly, the line of argument developed by critical race theorists that assumes that hate speech leads to the direct harm and violation of individuals’ rights. Secondly, paper examines the Weimar model that rests on the assumption that hate speech can lead to indirect harm to members (...) of vulnerable minorities by creating a toxic environment, which opens the door to discrimination and even violence. Thirdly, the justification which is derived from the idea that such forms of extreme public speech violate the basic values and principles – such as inclusiveness, equality and mutual respect - on which constitutional democracies are built. This approach extends its argument from general values to the status of citizens by arguing that hate speech violates the equal standing of citizens by attempting to exclude certain members of society from the process of democratic deliberation based on their ascriptive characteristics. The second part of the paper looks at counterspeech as an efficient approach to limit harms that arise from hate speech. The author argues that legal bans should be reserved only for the most extreme forms of hateful rhetoric, while counterspeech is a valid option for tackling all other forms of hate speech. (shrink)

Muslim communities in principally non-Muslim nation states (e.g. South Africa, United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) established a plethora of Muslim theological institutions. They have done so with the purpose of educating and reinforcing their Muslim identity. These educational structures have given rise to numerous questions that one encounters as one explores the rationale for their formation. Some are: have these institutions contributed towards the growth of Muslim extremism as argued by American and European Think Tanks? (...) If so, then in which and why did they do so? If not, then why have they been falsely accused, and how should Muslims counter these erroneous criticisms? And, more importantly, have some of these educational institutions—as agents of ‘social change’—contributed towards the ‘common good’ of the society? In response, the article attempts to investigate the reasons for the formation of these Muslim educational institutions within a broad Southern Africa democratic context. It prefaces the discussion by first constructing ‘social change’ as a viable theoretical frame and it thereafter places the madrasas and Dar ul-‘Ulums within the mentioned context prior to reflecting upon the notion of the ‘common good.’ It then proceeds by making reference to the Dar ul-‘Ulum curriculum that plays a significant role in shaping and moulding the theologians’ thinking and behaviour. It concludes by questioning to what extent the type of theological curriculum that they constructed assists them to contribute towards the ‘common good’ of Southern Africa’ societies. (shrink)

This study examined the ethical issues experienced by nurses working in a small group of elderly persons’ care settings in the UK, using a survey questionnaire previously used in other countries for examining the cultural aspects of ethical issues. However ‘culture’ relates not only to ethnicity but also the organizational culture in which care is delivered. Nurses working in elderly persons’ care settings described a range of issues faced when caring for elderly terminally ill people, which illustrated the different needs (...) of patients, relatives, professionals and society. These issues related to the unique needs of elderly people (such as dementia sufferers) and could have an impact on patients’ quality of death. (shrink)

How should the policies of search engines and other information intermediaries be ethically evaluated? It is argued that Kant’s principles for the public use of reason are useful starting points for the formulation of criteria for such an evaluation. The suggestion is, furthermore, that a search engine can be seen to provide a testimony to the user concerning what information that is most relevant to her query. This suggestion is used as the basis for the development of a broadly Kantian (...) account of a rational searcher. It is argued that the search engine companies are morally required to publish their information policies and act in accordance with them but given the threat of search engine spam they can have no obligation to publish the details of their algorithms. (shrink)